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REFERENCE TO REPORTS OF OPINIONS ISSUED BY COURT OF APPEALS
Ward v. Richfield City, 110 U.A.R. 58,
P.2d
(Utah Ct.
App. 1989) (The complete decisions of the District Court and
Court of Appeals are set forth in the Appendix.)
GROUNDS ON WHICH SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION IS INVOKED
The decision of the Court of Appeals which the Appellant is
seeking to be reviewed was entered on June 14, 1989. The Court
of Appeals denied the Appellant's Petition for Rehearing on July
10, 1989. Initially, the Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction of
this case pursuant to U.C.A. 1953, Section 78-2-2; however, the
Supreme Court transferred this case to the Utah Court of
Appeals. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to consider this
Writ of Certiorari pursuant to U.C.A., 1953, Section 78-2-2(5).
STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
Copies of all Statutes, Rules and Regulations are set forth
in full in the Appendix to this Writ.
STATUTES:
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended:
Section 10-3-909
Section 10-3-911
Section 10-3-916
Section 10-3-918 through 10-3-919
Section 10-3-924 through 10-3-926
Section 10-3-1001 through 10-3-1013
Section 10-3-1105 through 10-3-1106
Section 52-4-1 through 52-4-9 (Open and Public Meetings Act)
Section 78-2-2
RULES AND REGULATIONS:
Richfield City Police Department Policies and Procedures
Manual
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action by Appellant Boyd A,, Ward, a dismissed
marshal of Richfield City,
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DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT
On July 30, 1986, the District Court heard Ward's Motion for
Change of Venue, Motion to Amend the Complaint, Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, and Motion for Summary Judgment.
Court also heard Richfield's Motion for Summary Judgment*

The
The

Court denied Ward's Motion for Change of Venue, granted Ward's
Motion to Amend the Complaint, denied Ward's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, and terminated the original Temporary
Restraining Order retroactively to June 17, 1981, (Record, pages
391 and 392). The District Court took under advisement the two
Motions for Summary Judgment and subsequently denied Ward's
Motion and granted Richfield's Motion (Record, pages 386 to
388).

Ward appealed the decision of the District Court to the

Utah Supreme Court.

The Utah Supreme Court transferred the

appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals.
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the District
Court and entered the decision on June 14, 1989. On July 10,
1989, the Court of Appeals denied the Appellant's Petition for
Rehearing.

Appellant hereby requests that this Court reverse

those decisions on the basis of manifest error and enter
judgment in favor of Appellant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
When Ward was marshal of Richfield City, Richfield caused an
agenda to be prepared and distributed which listed the
anticipated activities for the Richfield City Council meeting on
April 2, 1981; however, the agenda did not contain the

4

information that Richfield was going to consider terminating
Ward as marshal.

Richfield went into a closed meeting and all

members of the public who were in attendance at the open meeting
were excluded from the closed meeting.

Kent Colby, an

individual who was excluded from the closed meeting, requested
that Richfield contact him in the event the closed meeting ended
so that he could be present if Richfield took any further action
affecting the community.

In the closed meeting Richfield

discussed terminating Ward as marshal. Richfield did not advise
the public that it was going back into open meeting.

Richfield

entered the termination of Ward in the minutes of the Council
meeting after the closed meeting was concluded.

Ward was

terminated as marshal or chief of police, effective on April 3,
1981.

On April 6, 1981, Ward submitted to Richfield a written

request for a hearing to appeal his termination.

Richfield did

not give Ward a hearing to appeal his termination.
On June 2, 1981, Ward advised Richfield he intended to take
legal action to challenge his termination.

On Friday, June 5,

1981, Richfield caused notice to be given to the local
newspaper, The Richfield Reaper, and the local radio station,
KSVC, that a non-scheduled City Council meeting was to be held
on Monday, June 8, 1981, at 8:00 a.m.

On June 8, 1989, prior to

the City Council meeting, all officials of Richfield were served
with a Temporary Restraining Order by which Richfield was
"ORDERED that the defendants, and each of them, be and they are
hereby temporarily restrained and enjoined from taking any
further action against plaintiff by way of terminating

5

plaintiff's services as chief of police of Richfield City,"
Richfield, after being served the Temporary Restraining Order,
took action against Ward to terminate him as Chief of police of
Richfield City by attempting to ratify the previous action taken
by Richfield in the closed meeting on April 2, 1981.
In the initial hearing before the trial court on June 17,
1981, the parties stipulated to specific facts. Those
stipulated facts are set forth below and reference is made to
the pages of the record where the stipulations are found:
1.

The agenda for the April 1, 1981, City Council meeting

did not state that Richfield would consider the termination of
Ward as Chief of Police (Record, page 47).
2.

During the Council meeting, Richfield went into a

closed meeting (Record, page 47).
3.

At the time that Richfield went into closed meeting,

the members of the public that were in attendance at the open
meeting were excluded from the closed meeting (Record, page 47).
4.

Kent Colby, the representative of KSVC Radio Station

who was a member of the public present at the Council meeting
when Richfield went into the closed meeting, requested that he
be contacted so that he could be present if Richfield went back
into open meeting to transact any further business (Record,
pages 48 and 49).
5.

Richfield did not communicate to Colby that it was

going back into open meeting to transact further public business
so that Colby could be present (Record, pages 48 and 49).
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6.

Ward was terminated as chief of police at the April 2,

1981, meeting by Richfield effective April 3, 1981 (Record, page
50).
7.

Termination of Ward as chief of police was entered on

the minutes of the council meeting after the closed meeting ws
concluded (Record, page 50).
8.

On Tuesday, June 2, 1981, Richfield through its

attorney, was advised that Ward intended to take action pursuant
to the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act (Record, page 51).
9.

On Friday, June 5, 1981, at approximately 5:30 p.m.,

notice of a special Richfield City Council meeting to be held on
Monday, June 8, 1981, at 8:00 a.m. was given to the local
newspaper, Richfield Reaper, and the local radio station, KSVC
(Record, page 51).
10.

On Monday, June 8, 1981, Richfield was served a

Temporary Restraining Order providing as follows:
It is ordered that the defendants and each of them be and
they are hereby temporarily restrained and enjoined from
taking any further action against plaintiff by way of
terminating plaintiff's services as Chief of Police of
Richfield City. (Record, pages 51 and 52.)
11.

Richfield, after having been served the Temporary

Restraining Order, violated the Temporary Restraining Order and
took action against Ward to terminate him as chief of police
(Record page 52).
ADDITIONAL FACTS
The District Court allowed Ward to file an amended complaint
(Record, pages 360 to 375, 391 and 392). The amended complaint
set forth an alternative cause of action that if Ward
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was legally fired that he was entitled to a hearing to appeal
the firing.

Since the trial court granted Richfieldfs Motion

for Summary Judgment, all of the facts alleged by Ward must be
viewed in a light favorable to Ward.

The pertinent facts

alleged by Ward are set forth below:
12.

On April 6, 1981, Ward submitted to Richfield a written

request for a hearing pursuant to Sections 10-3-1105 and
10-3-1106 to appeal his termination as Chief of Police (Record,
pages 293 to 300 and page 373, Exhibit n B , f ).
13.

Ward did not receive a hearing in response to his

written request to appeal his termination (Record, pages 293 to
299).
14.

Richfield enacted the Richfield City Police Department

Policies and Procedures Manual which was in effect on April 2,
1981 (Record, pages 328 to 331, Exhibit

lf

D").

ARGUMENTS
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ISSUED A DECISION IN CONFLICT WITH
DECISIONS OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT AND HAS DEPARTED FROM THE
ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS BY IGNORING
THE STIPULATED FACTS AND FACTS SET FORTH BY APPELLANT AND
RELYING UPON THE FACTS OF THE RESPONDENTS IN AFFIRMING THE
TRIAL COURTfS SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE APPELLANT
When a judgment is entered pursuant to a Motion for Summary
Judgment, the Court of Appeals, or any appellate court, must
analyze the judgment in a light favorable to the facts of the
Appellant and, basically, accept the facts of the Appellant as
being true;

however, the Court of Appeals in its opinion has

relied upon and cited several facts set forth by the Respondents
and contested by the Appellant.

Moreover, the facts
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relied upon by the Court of Appeals are contradicted by the
stipulated facts, which stipulated facts are binding upon both
the parties and the Court.
On page two of the decision of the Court of Appeals (the
decision is set forth in the appendix), the Court specifically
stated, "The Council was concerned about several recent
resignations within the Police Department."

The Appellant

specifically disputed the allegation that there had been recent
resignations.

There had been resignations or termination of six

officers over a period of six years.

Some of those resignations

had taken place prior to Ward becoming Chief of Police.
Moreover, in the record is the Affidavit of John Bettfruend
disputing the allegations.

Bettfruend was the acting Chief of

Police after Ward was dismissed and had previously been a police
officer in Richfield.

Bettfruend stated that he was not aware

of any threats of officers who intended to resign.
Of particular importance is the first footnote on page 3 of
the Court of Appeals1 decision.

The footnote reads as follows:

1.
Prior to the closed session, the Council asked whether
anyone present wanted to be notified if open session
resumed. Most of those present were members of the media
and they responded that they did not necessarily desire to
return, but wanted to be advised if action were taken.
In order to cite the above facts of the Respondents, the Court
of Appeals had to disregard the stipulated facts.

Stipulated

facts are binding not only upon the parties but also upon the
Court.

The stipulated facts are as follows:

4.
Kent Colby, the respresentative of KSVC Radio Station,
who was a member of the public present when Richfield went
into the closed meeting, requested that he be contacted so
that he could be present if Richfield went back into open

meeting to transact any further business (record, pp.
48-49).
5.
Richfield did not communicate to Colby that it was
going back into open meeting to transact further public
business so that Colby could be present (record, pp. 48-49).
These stipulated facts are extremely significant.

U.C.A.,

Section 52-4-4 of the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act in part
specifically states, "...provided, no ordinance, resolution,
rule, regulation, contract, or appointment shall be approved at
a closed meeting..."

Therefore, if one member of the public

specifically requested to be present when the Council went back
into open session and the Council did not communicate that it
was going back into open session, the Council was still in a
closed meeting because the public could not be present.
Therefore, the City Council was specifically prohibited by law
from passing any resolution.

Ahnert v. Sunnyside Unified School

Dist. No. 12, 126 Ariz. 473, 616 P.2d 933 (Ariz. App. 1980).
The minutes of the City Council meetings in the record in
this case show that all of the Council's decisions were done in
the form of a resolution.

A resolution is specifically

prohibited by the statute from being enacted in a closed
meeting.

Therefore, if the City Council was in a closed

meeting, any resolution was in violation of the Utah Open and
Public Meetings Act (U.C.A., 1953, Section 52-4-1, et. seq.).
In support of Ward's position and in opposition to the
Respondents1 Motion for Summary Judgment was an Affidavit of
Boyd Adams, a former chief of police in American Fork City.

The

Affidavit clearly indicated that the agenda of the American Fork
City Council stated that it was going to consider terminating
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Adams as chief of police.

In response to the notice of the

agenda, the public rallied behind Adams and caused the City
Council to keep him on as the chief of police*

This is a very

significant fact opposing the Respondents1 Motion for Summary
Judgment, When the people know what a public body is going to
do, they can significantly influence the public body.

The

Afidavit of Adams is completely on point with this case.

In its

analysis the Court of Appeals should have made the assumption
that the citizens of Richfield could have rallied behind
Appellant as the public rallied behind Adams.

Subsequent to his

termination, Ward was elected to the office of Constable,
demonstrating his popularity with the citizens.
It is very interesting to note that at page 3 in the
decision of the Court of Appeals that it specifically found
that, "The Council concluded the closed meeting with a unanimous
vote# one member abstaining, to discharge Ward.

Minutes of the

closed meeting were recorded and when the Council resumed open
session a formal vote to discharge Ward was taken."
added.]

[Emphasis

Thus, the Court of Appeals found that a decision to

terminate Appellant was made in the closed meeting.
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly stated that an appellate
court must review the facts of the party against whom Summary
Judgment has been granted in a manner most favorable to him.
Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 123 Utah 289 259 P.2d 297 (1953);
Young v. Texas Co., 8 Utah 2d 206, 331 P.2d 1099 (1958); Brandt
v. Springville Banking Co., 10 Utah 2d 350, 353 P.2d 460 (1960);
Bridge v. Backmanf 10 Utah 2d 366, 353 P.2d 909 (1960);
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Allen's Prods, Co, v. Glover, 18 Utah 2d 9, 414 P.2d 93 (1966);
Geneva Pipe Co, v, S & H Ins, Co,f 714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1986),
The Court of Appeals has not analyzed this case in a light
favorable to the facts of the Appellant.

In view of the

Appellant's facts and the stipulated facts, it is obvious that
the City did not publish an agenda and give notice that Ward
would be fired.

Futhermore, it is obvious that the City Council

actually made the decision in a closed meeting.

Both actions

violate of the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act.

Moreover, the

Affidivit of Adams establishes what can happen when public
notice is given.

Thus, on the basis of the facts asserted by

Appellant and the stipulated facts, this Court should reverse
the decision of the Court of Appeals.
II. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN THIS CASE IS IN
CONFLICT WITH THE DECISIONS OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT IN WARD
V. RICHFIELD CITYy 716 P.2d 265 (UTAH 1984), CALL V. WEST
JORDAN, 727 P.2d 180 (UTAH 1986), AND COMMON CAUSE OF UTAH V.
UTAH PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, 598 P.2d 1312 (UTAH 1979).
The Utah Supreme Court in Ward v. Richfield City, 716 P.2d
265 (Utah 1984), held that the legislature has made a
distinction between cities of the first and second class and
cities of the third class.

It further pointed out that the

entire municipal code was rewritten in 1977.

In light of these

concepts, two separate sets of statutes must be analyzed.

The

first set of statutes is Sections 10-3-1105 and 10-3-1106.
Section 10-3-1105 states as follows:
All appointive officers and employees of the
municipalities, other than members of the police
departments, fire departments, heads of departments, and
superintendents, shall hold their employments without
limitation of time, being subject to discharge or dismissal
only as hereinafter provided.
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The Court of Appeals stated that it is necessary to review
individual statutes in terms of the entire body of statutes.
The language which is troublesome in Section 10-3-1105 is,
"..•members of the police departments, fire departments, heads
of departments..."

The second set of statutes is Sections

10-3-1001 through 1013.

These pertain to cities of the first

and second class and clarify the troublesome language.

These

statutes require cities of the first and second class to
maintain a Civil Service Commission, which controls the appeals
of "members of the police departments" of cities of those
cities.

Furthermore, Section 10-3-909 states,

The Board of City Commissioners or other governing body of
each city of the first or the second class shall create,
support, maintain and control a police department and may
create, support, maintain and control a fire department in
their respective cities. [Emphasis added.]
Section 10-3-916, at the time this case arose, provided that
each city of the third class would appoint a marshal.
It is clear from a review of the statutes, that municipal
employees in general, can appeal their firing pursuant to
Section 10-3-1105, and that members of the police departments
and fire departments can appeal their firing pursuant to
Sections 10-3-1001 through 1012. This Court stated in the Ward
Case, supra, at page 266,
Conspicuously absent from this statute is the
provision contained in Section 10-3-911 making the removal
of the chief of police free from all judicial oversight.
"It probably is not wholly inaccurate to suppose that
ordinarily when people say one thing they do not mean
something else." 2AC. Sands, Sutherland Statutory
Construction, Section 47-01, as sighted in Hansen v.
Wilkinson, Utah, 658 P.2d 1216 (1983). We construe a
statute on the assumption that each term is used advisedly
and that the intent of the legislature is revealed in the
use of the term in the context and structure in which it is
placed. [Emphasis added.]

Sections 10-3-916, 10-3-918, 10-3-919 authorized third class
cities to have a marshal and assistants•

The legislature never

authorized a third class city to have a "police department".

As

the Supreme Court noted, "It probably is not wholly inaccurate
to suppose that ordinarily when people say one thing they do not
mean something else."

This Court is referred to Sections

10-3-924 through 926 which set forth the appointment, term of
office and duties of a city manager.

These sections were also

enacted in 1977. The legislature specifically states that a
city manager may be terminated at will by the governing body.
It can be concluded that if the legislature intended to prevent
marshals of cities of the third class from appealing
termination, it would have stated so as it did with city
managers.

Thus, contrary to the opinion of the Court of

Appeals, marshals of a third class city do have a statutory
right of appeal pursuant to Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106.
In Call v. West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1986), the Utah
Supreme Court struck down an ordinance of West Jordan City,
which ordinance had been enacted in violation of statutory
requirements.

Therefore, to be consistent with that decision,

this Court should void the actions of Richfield which are in
violation of statute and reverse the Summary Judgment against
the Appellant.
This Court specifically held in Common Cause of Utah v. Utah
Public Service Commission, 598 P.2d 1312 (Utah 1979), that,
although the Public Service Commission may have quasi-judicial
discussions and determinations in a closed meeting, no final
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decisions can be made in a closed meeting but must be made in an
open meeting.

Thus, the Court of Appeals has allowed Richfield

to violate the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act by not voiding
the actions of Richfield in firing Ward on April 2, 1981.
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals stated at page 4, "Even
if technical violations had occurred in the April meeting, they
were subsequently cured."

The Court seems to suggest that if a

law is violated it can be cured at a later date.
correct.

If a law is violated, it is violated.

This is not
If a public

body is going to "cure" a violation at a later date, the only
way it can do so is by accomplishing the action in accordance
with the statutory requirements.

There are criminals and others

who would like to "cure" an original violation of a statute.
The decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed.
III.

THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS SUBSITUTED ITS OWN
DISCRETION FOR SPECIFIC LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF THE
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF UTAH BY ALLOWING RESPONDENTS
TO VIOLATE THE UTAH OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETINGS ACT

The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in their respective
opinions have raised the question, "What is in the public
interest?"

The legislature in U.C.A., Section 52-4-1, answers

that question as follows:
In enacting this chapter the legislature finds and
declares that the State, its agencies and political
subdivisions, exist to aid in the conduct of the people's
business. It is the intent of the law that the action of
public bodies be taken openly and that the deliberations be
conducted openly.
It is an abuse of discretion for both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals to subsitute their perceptions of what is
best for the public instead of upholding the written intent of
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the legislature that the people's business must be deliberated
and conducted openly.

Thus, Ward respectfully argues that it is

in the public interest for Richfield to comply strictly and
completely with

statutes and orders of the courts.

It is not

in the best interest of the people for any public body to
violate statutes and court orders.
IV. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS SPECIFICALLY
RULED THAT APPELLANT WAS A MEMBER OF THE RICHFIELD CITY
POLICE DEPARTMENT, BUT HAS INCORRECTLY DENIED HIM THE
RIGHTS OF APPEAL EXTENDED TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE POLICE
DEPARTMENT BY THE "RICHFIELD CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
POLICIES AND PROCEDURE MANUAL"
The Court of Appeals in footnote 4 at page 6 of the decision
summarily stated that the "Richfield City Police Department
Policy and Procedures Manual" does not pertain to the chief of
police.

Subparagraph W of the Manual states, "Dismissals are

subject to appeal to the Richfield Appeals Board.

Procedures

for such appeals are outlined in the Richfield City Personnel
Policies and Procedures Manual."

[Emphasis added.]

Appellant was an employee of Richfield City.

The

Certainly as a

member of the department, as so held by the Court of Apeals, he
was entitled to an appeal.

Thus, any employee of Richfield City

who is fired has the right to appeal to the Richfield City
Appeals Board pursuant to procedures enacted by Richfield.

This

Court of Appeals was in error in using a footnote to strip Ward
of the benefits of that policy enacted by the Richfield City
Council.

Therefore, Ward should be entitled to the appeal

process created by Richfield City.
V.

THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS UPHELD THE INCONSISTENT DECISION
OF THE TRIAL COURT REGARDING THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER WHICH WAS VIOLATED BY THE RESPONDENTS
16

In the Order Granting Summary Judgment, dated September 29,
1986# the Trial Court provided that it would not be in the
public interest to disturb the actions of Richfield on April 2,
and June 8, 1981. However, in its Order dated October 22, 1986,
subsequent to the Order granting Summary Judgment, the Court
stated as follows:
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff's
Motion for Preliminary Injunction is denied, and it is
specifically ordered that the Temporary Restraining Order
terminated on June 17, 1981, the date of the first hearing
before this Court.
The parties stipulated that:
11. Richfield, after having been served the Temporary
Restraining Order, violated the Temporary Restraining Order
and took action against Ward to terminate him as chief of
police (Record, page 52).
The Trial Court specifically terminated the restraining order on
June 17, 1981. Thus, the Respondents violated the Temporary
Restraining Order of the Court on June 8, 1981. The Appellant
is entitled to rely upon the last Order of the Court making the
Temporary Restraining Order binding upon the Respondents until
June 17, 1981. The Supreme Court should uphold the judicial
authority of the courts to issue a Temporary Restraining Order
upon a public body and the need for the public body to comply
with the Order.
VI.

THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED AN IMPORTANT, SPECIFIC
QUESTION OF MUNICIPAL LAW WHICH HAS NOT BEEN,
BUT SHOULD BE, DECIDED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT.

The issue of what a public body may do and may not do in
relationship to the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act is
important.

Pursuant to U.C.A., Section 78-2-2, the Supreme
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Court is given original jurisdiction over such appeals. The
Supreme Court referred this matter to the Court of Appeals.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals has made a decision which is
not consistent with the previous decisions of this Court.
Moreover, the Court of Appeal has undermined the need for public
bodies to comply with statutes and Court orders. Therefore,
this Court should consider these matters and render a decision.
Respondents prepared an agenda for the April 2, 1981, City
Council meeting; however, Respondents did not list on the agenda
that they would consider terminating Appellant as marshal.

The

failure to give public notice was in violation of U.C.A., 1953,
Section 52-4-6.

Furthermore, Richfield excluded all members of

the public from the City Council meeting when it went into a
closed meeting.

During the closed meeting, Respondents decided

to fire Ward as marshal.

U.C.A, 1953, Section 52-4-3

specifically prohibits public bodies from taking actions in
closed meetings.

The Appellant and the Respondents stipulated

in open court that a member of the public had requested to be
present when the City Council went back into open meeting;
however, the City Council did not advise that person as he had
requested.

Thus, it was impossible for any member of the public

to be present at the meeting.

Therefore, the acts of Richfield

should be declared null and void and the decision of the Court
of Appeals should be reversed.
The Utah legislature has provided that municipal employees
may appeal their termination from employment.

The legislature

has also required first and second class cities to maintain
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police "departments" but has enacted specific statutes for the
members of those "departments" to appeal their termination. On
the other hand, the legislature has only required third class
cities to appoint a marshal and has given third class cities the
discretion to appoint assistants to the marshal.

The marshal

and assistants are not members of a police "department" and,
therefore, have rights of appeal as specified for all other
municipal employees.

In the case of Worrall v. Ogden City Fire

Department, 616 P.2d 598 (Utah 1980), this Court ruled that a
person discharged from a department must be informed of his
right to a hearing.
of appeal.

Thus, this Court has reinforced the rights

Consequently, if Ward was legally fired, he had the

right to appeal his discharge and the lower Courts erred in not
granting him the right to that appeal.

Moreover, Ward should be

entitled to an appeal hearing pursuant to the provisions of the
"Richfield City Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual".
These are extremely important legal issues. Whenever a
public body violates specific prohibitions placed upon it by the
legislature; whenever a public body publically disregards a
restraining order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction;
and whenever an individual is unable to appeal termination of
employment when procedures are established both by the State
legislature and by the municipality for which the person is
employed; there are grave injustices and abuses of power.
Therefore, these matters should be addressed by the Supreme
Court, and the decision of the Court of Appeals should be
reversed.
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Appellant prays that this Court will void the actions of
Richfield, reinstate him, and award him back pay, employment
benefits, attorney fees, general damages, punitive damages, and
any other relief this Court deems appropriate.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ? ?

day of August, 1989.

The attorney for Appellant Boyd A. Ward respectfully hereby
certifies that this Writ of Certiorari is made in good faith
without any intent to delay the proceedings herein.

GeorgerE. Brown, Jr.
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of
Appellant's Writ of Certiorari of Appellant were mailed, postage
prepaid, this ^ day of August, 1989, to the following:
Ken Chamberlain
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents
76 South Main Street
Richfield, Utah 84701
•7
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DISTRICT COURT ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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m0ll,

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BOYD A. WARD,
P U i n C l f f

-

-vs-

ORDER
Civil No. 8626

RICHFIELD CITY, a municipal
Corporacion, ec alf
Defendanc.

The Plaintiff and Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgments
on stipulated facts came before the Court on July 30, 1986.
The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is Denied.

The

The Defendant1s

Objection to Bill of Costs is Denied, except for che amounc of che
cash bond which has been returned by Court Order Co Plaintiff.
The Court finds that in accordance wich 10-6-32 UCA, the law in
effect at the time of this case, the cerm of the Chief of Police of a
Third Class City shall be until the municipal election next following
his appoinCmenC, unless sooner removed by Che Mayor wich che concurrence
of a majoricy of members of Che Cicy Council, or by che Cicy Council wich
Che concurrence of che mayor.
The Court finds that Richfield City called a public meeting;
Chac che agenda delivered to the news media

did noc have on ic any

information concerning the termination of the Police Chief; chac che
Cicy Council went into executive session during che public reccing

-2-

and later reconvened to announce the Police Chief termination.
Section 52-4-3 UCA provides that meetings should be open to
the public.

Section 52-4-8 provides that any final action taken in vio-

lation of Section 52-4-3 and Section 52-4-6 is voidable by a Court of
competent jurisdiction.
The absence of an item of business on the Agenda does not preclude
its consideration.

The "sunshine law" 52-4-1 UCA etc., provides that

meetings are open to the public.
news media.

The agenda is to be delivered to the

The penalty for violation is voidable by a Court of competent

jurisdiction.

Tie act does not establish any right to be heard or to

participate in debate, or to be represented by witnesses or legal council.
The purpose of the act is informational in its objective and does not
provide a procedural process for persons affected by legislative acts
of the Council except as above stated.
The Court finds that it would not be in the public interest to
void the action taken by the Richfield City Council on April 2, 1981, and
as ratified by it in a June 8, 1981 meeting.
The only issue the Plaintiff in this case could litigate is whether
or not the Mayor and Counsel voted to terminate him, and the affidavits
filed in this case conclusively stated they did and they thereby dispose
of that issue.
The Court finds that the dismissal was not malicious or in wanton
disregard of Plaintiff's rights.
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CIVIL NO. 8626
Ward -vs- Richfield City
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

Mailed a copy of the above and foregoing Order to the following,
postage prepaid from offices at Manti, Utah, thi * 2 ?

day of Sep tember,

1986:
Ken Chamberlain, Attorney at Law
76 South Main
Richfield, Utah, 84701
George E. Brown, Jr.
Attorney at Law
7001 South 900 East Suite 340
Midvale. Utah. 84047
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?m£l^

Carole
Trial Court Executive
Manti, Utah, 84642

DISTRICT COURT ORDER PERTAINING TO
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

CtORGE E. BROWN, J H . jA3GltI|
. 7 ^ Attorney f o r p i a i n t i f f
7001 South 900 East, S u i t elSfrl BCI 27 PH 12- «4 2
Midvale, UT 84047
Telephone: (801) 562-55S5:;Y
I" THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COU RT IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
QOYD A. WARD,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

vs.
RICHFIELD CITY,
a municipal corporation, et al.

Civil No. 8626

Defendant.
The Plaintiff

and his attorney, George E. Brown, Jr., and

the attorney for defendants, Ken Chamberla.n, appeared before
the Honorable Don V. Tibbs on the 30th day of July, 1986.

The

Court, having reviewed the plaintiffs Motion for Change of
Venue, the plaintiff's Motion for Prelir
.mi nary Injunction, and
the plaintiff
s Motion to Ainend Complaint, arguments having been
made,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the plaintiff's Motion for

Change

of Venue is denied.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the p.aintiff 's .Motion to A^end
the Complaint is granted subject to the defendant's right to
provide further opposing argument in the event that the
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

since the

defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment addresses the new cause
of action contained in the plaintiff's Amended Complaint, the

granting of the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment will
result in judgment against the plaintiff on all causes of action
contained in the plaintiff's Amended Complaint.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction is denied, and it is specifically ordered
that the Temporary Restraining Order terminated on June 17,
1981, the date of the first hearing before this Court.

DATED this 2^2-day of

OCK t)ltM

, 1986.

-R¥—THE COURT:

I hereby certify that I ma-iled a true and cornect copy of
the foregoing Order, postage prepaid, on this t<^ytJ{day of
October, 1986, to the following individual:
Ken Chamberlain
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN
Attorneys for Defendants
76 South Main Street
Richfield, UT 84701
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RICHFIELD CITY, a municipal
corporation; RICHFIELD CITY
COUNCIL, a political subdivision
of the State of Utah; KENDRICK
HARWARD, individually and in his
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Richfield City and as a member of
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individually and in his official
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Richfield City Council; KAY
KIMBALL, individually and in his
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I through V,
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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—

Boyd A. Ward,
OPINION
(For Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

Case No. 880713-CA
Richfield City, a municipal
corporation, et al.#
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^ W y T Nco.ian
Clark of *\* Court
Utoh Court of Appeals

George E. Brown, Jr., Midvale, for Appellant
Ken Chamberlain, Richfield, for Respondents

Before Judges Davidson, Billings, and Garff.
DAVIDSON, Judge:
This appeal concerns whether appellant, Boyd Ward, was
properly dismissed as Richfield C ity Chief of Police. Ward
claimed below that the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act was
violated, that the Richfield City Council disregarded a
temporary restraining order by ta king further subsequent
action to dismiss him as Chief of Police, and that his request
for an administrative appeal was improperly denied. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of Richfield City. We
affirm.
FACTS
On April 2, 1981, the Richfield City Council held a public
meeting after publishing an agenda as required by Utah Code
Ann. § 52-4-6 (1981). The agenda did not list Ward's
discharge as Chief of Police. Following discussion of items
on the agenda, the Council voted to hold a closed meeting and

invited Ward to join them in discussing his position as Chief
of Police. The Council was concerned about several recent
resignations within the police department. Discussion of
Ward's termination ensued and the Council decided to terminate
Ward. The Council resumed open session and formally voted to
discharge Ward effective April 3, 1981.
On April 6, 1981/ Ward submitted a written request to the
Council for an administrative appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§§ 10-3-1105 and -1106 (1981). The request was denied. On
June 5# 1981, the Council published notice that a special
meeting would be held on June 8, 1981, to ratify its actions
taken at the April meeting. The Council published an agenda
that included Ward's discharge as an item for discussion.
Prior to the meeting, Ward served the Council with a temporary
restraining order, to restrain it from taking any further
action against him. Despite the~temporary restraining order,
the Council ratified its decision to terminate Ward.
On June 17, 1981, the trial court held a preliminary
injunction hearing and determined that pursuant to the removal
statute for chiefs of police, Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-911
(repealed 1987), it had no jurisdiction to hear the matter.
Section 10-3-911 stated in part that "[t]he chief of police or
fire department of the cities may at any time be removed,
without a trial, hearing or opportunity to be heard, by the
board of commissioners whenever in its opinion the good of the
service will be served thereby."
Ward appealed the trial court's decision to the Utah
Supreme Court and the court decided in Ward v. Richfield City,
716 P.2d 265 (Utah 1984), that the trial court did have
jurisdiction because section 10-3-911 did not pertain to third
class cities. The case was remanded to the trial court. On
remand, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
Richfield City. The court ruled that although the agenda for
the April 2, 1981 meeting did not include the termination of
Ward as Chief of Police, nevertheless, it was not in the public
interest to void the Council's action at either the April 2 or
the June 8 meeting.
Ward contends on appeal that: (1) the Council violated the
Utah Open and Public. Meetings Act in the April 2, 1981 meeting;
(2) the Council, on June 8, 1981, acted in violation of the
temporary restraining order; (3) the Council wrongfully denied
him the right to appeal his discharge; (4) the trial court
erroneously applied the law in granting summary judgment in
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favor of Richfield City; and (5) he is entitled to
reinstatement, back pay and damages.
UTAH OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETINGS ACT
We first examine whether the Council violated the Utah Open
and Public Meetings Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 52-4-1 to -9 (1981),
at the. April 2, 1981 meeting and if so, whether the June 8
meeting cured any such violation. The purpose of the Utah Open
and Public Meetings Act is to ensure that the actions of the
state, its agencies, and political subdivisions are conducted
openly, fiefi Common Cause of Utah v. Utah Public Serv. Comm'n,
598 P.2d 1312 (Utah 1979). Political subdivisions, as defined
in Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-201 (1981), include municipal
corporations and municipalities. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-601
(1981) provides that all meetings of the governing body of each
municipality shall be held in compliance with the provisions of
the open and public meetings law.
Ward contends that Richfield City failed to comply with the
agenda and notice provisions of the open meetings law and that
such failure should void the action taken at the April
meeting. Ward argues that the subject of his discharge should
have been listed on the agenda, even if discussions regarding
him were conducted in a closed meeting. This contention fails
for two reasons. First, the open meetings act designates
certain subjects which are exempt from discussion in open
meetings. See section 52-4-5. Where at least two-thirds of
the public body present at an open meeting vote to hold a
closed meeting to discuss the character, professional
competence, or physical or mental health of an individual, then
a closed meeting may be held. See section 52-4-4. The Council
voted in the April open meeting to sequester themselves to
discuss Ward's professional competence in compliance with
section 52-4-4. The Council concluded the closed meeting with
a unanimous vote, one member abstaining, to discharge Ward.
Minutes of the closed meeting were recorded and when the
Council resumed open session, a formal vote to discharge Ward
was taken.1
1. Prior to the closed session, the Council asked whether
anyone present wanted to be notified if open session resumed.
Most of those present were members of the media and they
responded that they did not necessarily desire to return, but
wanted to be advised if action were taken.
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Second, even if technical violations had occurred in the
April meeting, they were subsequently cured. On June 5, notice
of the special session scheduled for June 8 was provided to the
local newspaper and the radio station in compliance with the
agenda and notice provisions of section 52-4-6(3). The agenda
for theJune 8 meeting included Ward's discharge and the media
was notified more than twenty-four hours in advance. At the
June meeting, the Council voted without opposition to ratify
its actions taken at the April meeting. Ward argues that the
action taken at the June meeting violated the temporary
restraining order.2 The order restrained the Council from
taking any further action against him. Richfield City argues
that the June meeting merely ratified action that had already
been taken and, therefore, was not new action.
In a proceeding for violation of an injunction, it is
generally neia tnat tne extent ot tne pumsnment rests in tne
sound discretion of the court. See Henslev v. Board of
Education, 210 Kan. 858, 504 P.2d 184, 189 (1972); People v.
Mulqrew, 19 111. App. 3d 327, 311 N.E.2d 378, 383 (1974). "The
inherent power of a court rendering a permanent injunction to
enforce its decree and to modify or revoke the injunction for
equitable reasons due to changed conditions is generally
recognized . . . ." Mulqrew, 311 N.E.2d at 382. The trial
court held that it was not in the public's best interest to
void the action taken by the Council in terminating Ward. We
will not disturb judgments in injunction proceedings that rest
within the sound discretion of the trier of facts, unless an
abuse of discretion clearly appears from the record. See
Hensley. 504 P.2d at 188.
RIGHT TO APPEAL DISCHARGE
The Mayor, with the advice and consent of the Council,
appointed Ward to the position of Richfield City Chief of
Police, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-916 (1981). This
same body had the authority to dismiss Ward, without a hearing,
notice, or cause. In Hutchison v. Cartwriaht, 692 P.2d 772,
773-774 (Utah 1984), the court held that unless otherwise
controlled by statute, the power to suspend or dismiss is
2. Ward asserts that he would have mobilized supporters had he
known the Council planned on taking action despite the
temporary restraining order. However, the council was under no
duty to notify Ward personally of its intended action.
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appurtenant to the power to appoint. -When an individual is
appointed by an official, •the office is held during the
pleasure of the authority making the appointment, and . . . no
notice or charges or hearings are required for the suspension
or removal by the authority appointing the officer.•" I&. at
774 (quoting Sheriff of Salt Lake County v. Board of Comm'rs,
71 Utah 593, 268 P. 783, 784 (1928)). "The rule of common law
was that the appointment to municipal office carried with it no
vested property interest in continued employment, and such
officers were subject to removal without cause, reason or
hearing unless otherwise prescribed.- Carlson v. Bratton, 681
P.2d 1333, 1337 (Wyo. 1984). Since the Utah Supreme Court
determined that section 10-3-911 did not apply, there is not an
applicable statute explicitly governing the dismissal of chiefs
of police or city marshals in third class cities.3
Therefore, based on common law, we conclude that the Mayor and
the Council had independent authority to discharge Ward,
without a hearing, notice or cause.
Ward, nevertheless, contends that he has a right to appeal
his discharge under sections 10-3-1105 and -1106. Section
10-3-1105 provides that "[a]11 appointive officers and

employees of municipalities, other than members of the PQUce
departments, fire departments, heads of departments, and
superintendents, shall hold their employment without limitation
of time, being subject to discharge or dismissal only as
hereinafter provided." (Emphasis added.) Ward argues that he
does not fall within the exception because he is not a member
of a "police department" per se, but a city marshal with
appointed assistants. However, we read sections 10-3-1105 and
-1106 as specifically excluding him. Other sections in chapter
10 use the term "chief of police" interchangeably with "city
marshal." See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-918 (1986). As

3. Ward contends that the trial court erroneously applied Utah
Code Ann. § 10-6-32 which was repealed in 1977. This section
provided for the term of employment and removal of appointed
officers, without cause, in first, second and third class
cities. This section was not replaced with a statute expressly
directing the removal of chiefs of police in third class
cities. However, in light of our analysis that Ward does not
have a right to appeal and that he can be removed without
cause, we find that the trial court, nevertheless, reached the
correct result. Therefore, the trial court's application of
section 10-6-32 was harmless error.

880713-CA
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Chief of Police, we hold that Ward is both a member of a
-police department- and the head of that -department.Ward also argues that even if he falls within the
exception to section 10-3-1105 because he is a chief of
police, nevertheless, the language in the second sentence of
section 10-3-1106 applies to -any officer.- Because these
sections must be read together and should harmonize with the

purpose of the whole act, Jensen v, Interrooimtain Health Care,
Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984), we hold that the language
-as hereinafter provided- in section 10-3-1105 specifically
modifies the sections that follow. -Separate parts of [an]
act should not be construed in isolation from the rest of the

act.-

id. S&s also Stahl v, Utah Transit Autht, 618 p.2d

480, 481 (Utah 1980). Therefore, -any officer- as appears in
section 10-3-1106 must mean any officer not excluded in
section 10-3-1105.
Our holding is in keeping with the rationale behind the
power to discharge a chief of police without a hearing,
notice, or cause. Since the chief of police is appointed to
carry out the policies of the mayor -[t]he position of chief
of police is clearly recognized as different than that of any
other position in the police department for the obvious reason
that the chief of police is in a position of making and
carrying out policy for the mayor." Carlson, 681 P.2d at
1335. The result is there is no protected property interest
in the position of chief of police. I£. at 1337.4

4. Ward contends that he has a right to appeal under the
-Richfield City Police Department Policies and Procedures
Manual.- The pertinent sections of the manual provide that a
member of the department may request a review of disciplinary
action by submitting a written request to the chief of police
and that dismissals are subject to appeal to the Richfield
City Appeals Board. However, these sections specifically
pertain to officers under the supervision of the chief of
polfce and not to the chief himself.

880713-CA
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The summary judgment is affirmed.

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

WE CONCUR:

880713-CA
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June 14, 1989

OPINION

This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted, and the
Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is now
ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the District
Court herein be, and the same is, affirmed.
Opinion of the Court by RICHARD C. DAVIDSON, Judge; JUDITH M.
BILLINGS and REGNAL W. GARFF, Judges, concur.
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10-3-917.

the second class shall be an office of record for all
maps, plans, plats, profiles, drawings, final estimates, specifications and contracts which in any way
relate to the public improvements and engineering
affairs of the city The city engineer shall be custodian of all drawings and documents above mentioned
!*T7
10-3-9O4. Books and supplies - Recording, filing
and inspection.
The city engineer's office shall be supplied with
all necessary books, cases and supplies for recording
wd filing as required. The city engineer shall record
and file all drawings and documents pertaining to
public lands and improvements. Those made in his
office shall be placed on record as soon as completed and shall then be open for public inspections,
and any person copying the same or taking notes
therefrom may do so in penal only. He shall keep
the records and files in good condition and turn the
same over to ht$ successor in office. He shall allow
no alteration, mutilation or changes to be made in
any matter of record, and shall be held strictly accountable for the same.
\m
10-3-905. Fees to be paid in advance.
The city engineer shall not record any drawings or
instruments, or file any papers or notices, or furnish
any copies, or render any service connected with his
office, until the fees for the same are paid or tendered as prescribed by law or ordinance.
\m
10-3-906. Seil.
The citv engineer shall be provided with a seal by
(he city for his use, containing the words '
City, Utah, Engineering Department* The seal shall
be affixed to every certification approval.
\m
10-3-907. Recordation not to interfere with other
recordation.
The recording or filing of any drawing or instrument in the city engineer's office shall not interfere
or conflict in any way with the recording or filing of
fhe same in other offices of record
\m
10-3-903. Noncompliance a misdemeanor.
Any city engineer who fails to comply with sections 10-3-903 through 10-3-907 is guilty of a
misdemeanor.
\*n
10-3-909. Police and fire departments in cities of
the first and second class.
The board of city commissioners or other governing body of each aty of the first or the second
class shall create, support, maintain and control a
police department and may create, support, maintain and control a fire department m their respective

state any cause for removal. From the time of notification the person removed shall not in any case be
entitled to any salary or compensation
irn
20-3-912. Department heads m»y suspend
subordinates.
The chief of each department may at any time
suspend any subordinate officers, member, employee or agent employed therein when in his judgment the good of the service demands it, for a
penod of time not exceeding 15 days, and during
the time of suspension the person suspended shall
not be entitled to any salary or compensation whatsoever
\rn
10-3-913. Powers and duties of chief of police.
The chief of police shall, in the discharge of his
duties, have the same powers, responsibilities as
sheriffs and constables; he shall suppress riots, disturbances and breaches of the peace, and apprehend
all persons committing any offense against the laws
of the state or the ordinances of the city. He shall at
all times diligently and faithfully discharge his duties
and enforce all ordinances and regulations of the
city for the preservation of peace, good order and
the protection of the rights and property of all
persons.
\m
10*3-914. Police officers - Powers and duties.
The police officers of any municipality shall have
the same powers and responsibilities as constables.
It shall be the duty of the police force in any municipality at all times to preserve the public peace,
prevent crime, detect and arrest offenders, suppress
riots, protect persons and property, remove nuisances existing in the public streets, roads and highways, enforce every law relating to the suppression
of offenses, and perform all duties required of them
by ordinance or resolution.
\m
10-3-915. Rights to arrest without warrant.
The .members of the police force shall have the
power and authority, without process, to arrest and
take into custody any person who shall commit or
threaten or attempt to commit in the presence of the
officer, or within his view, any breach of the peace,
or any offense directly prohibited by the laws of this
state or by ordinance.
\m
10-3-916. Recorder, treasurer, marshal In dties of
third class and towns.
In each city of the third class and town on or
before the first Monday in February following a
municipal election the mayor, with the advice and
consent of the city council, shall appoint a qualified
person to each of the offices of city recorder, treaC
»l«.
surer, and marshal The city recorder shall be ex
tV 7f
officio the city auditor and shall perform the duties
10-3-910. Heads of departments and subordinate
of such office. The mayor, with the advice and
officers.
The administration o( the police and fire depart- consent of the council, may also appoint and fill
m
*nts shall consist of a chief of the department and vacancies in all such officers and agents as may be
such officers, members, employees and agents as the provided for by law or ordinance, except as is othboard of commissioners may by ordinance prescribe, erwise provided by law. All officers shall continue in
iad.ihe-board ofc-^omimwoners shall-appoint^ the office until their successors are appointed and qua!«J
heads of such departments.
im lified.
10-3*917. Engineer In dties of the third class and
10-3-911. Removal of departmental heads.
towns.
The chief of the police or fire department of the
Cll
The governing body of cities of the third class and
«es may at any time be removed, without a trial,
"«nng or opportunity to be heard, by the board of towns may by ordinance establish the office of
COr
nmissioners whenever in its opinion the good of municipal engineer and prescribe the duties and
,h
c service will be served thereby Its action m obligations for that office which are consistent with
^moving the chief of either department shall be the duties and obligations of the city engineer in
,n
*l and conclusive and shall not be received or cities of the first and second class. Where a city of
c
*Ned m question before any court. The city reco- the third class or town uses the engineer employed
ver shall forthwith notify in writing the removed by the county in which the municipality is located,
ch,
cf of his removal, and it shall not be necessary to the municipality may, by ordinance prescribe for its
For ANNOTATIONS, ctmtvtt ikt UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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10-3-918.

Cities and

municipal engineer either the duties of a municipal
engineer or, if different, the duties of the county
engineer, or a combination of duties.
\m
10-3-918. Chief of police or marshal in third class
cities and towns.
In cities of the third class and towns, the chief of
police or marshal shall exercise and perform such
duties as may be prescribed by the governing body
The chief of police or marshal shall be under the
direction, control and supervision of the mayor. The
chief of police or marshal may with the consent of
the mayor, appoint assistants to the chief of police
or marshal.
I9t3
10-3-919. Powers, duties and obligations of
police chief, marshal and their assistants in cities
of the third class and towns.
The chief of police, marshals and their assistants
in cities of the third class and towns shall have all of
the powers, rights and duties respectively conferred
on such officers in sections 10-3-913 through 103-915.
tin
10-3-920. Bail commissioner - Powers and
duties.
The mayor of any city of the third class, with the
advice and consent of the city council, and the
board of commissioners in other cities, may appoint
from among the officers and members of the police
department of the city one or more discreet persons
to be known as bail commissioners, who shall have
and exercise all the powers which are now or hereafter may be conferred by law upon justices of the
peace or judges of the circuit court in respect to the
fixing of bail of persons arrested within the corporate limits of the city for misdemeanors under the
laws of the state or for violation of the city ordinances, and to the taking and the approving of the
same. Any person who has been ordered by any
such bail commissioner to give bail may deposit the
amount thereof in money with such bail commissioner.
I9t3
10-3-921. Fines • Collection by bail
commissioner - Accounting.
In addition to their duties in respect to the fixing
of bail, bail commissioners shall have power on
nonjudicial days, and after the hour of 5 o'clock
p.m. and before the hour of 9 o'clock a.m. on
judicial days, to collect and receipt for moneys
tendered in payment of the fine of any person
serving sentence in default of the payment of such
fine. Ail moneys collected by bail commissioners
shall be accounted for at least once a month to the
clerk of the circuit court in cities where a municipal
department of the circuit court exists, and in cities
where such department does not exist such accounting shall be made to the city treasurer, or in cases
arising under the state laws to the county treasurer.
irn
10-3-922. Term of bail commissioners • Salary
- Bond and oath.
Commissioners appointed under this article shall
serve at the pleasure of the governing body or
mayor appointing them, and shall receive no compensation as such. Before entering upon their duties
as bail commissioners they shall take and subscribe
an oath to faithfully and impartially discharge the
duties of their office, and shall give bond to the city
wherein they are appointed, with two good and
sufficient individual sureties or with a single corporate surety, to be approved by the governing body
or mayor appointing them, which bond shall be in
the sum of $2,500, conditioned for the faithful
performance of their duties as such commissioners,
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and that they will well and truly account for and
turn over to the clerk of the circuit court or to the
treasurer of their respective cities or counties, as the
case may be at such times as may be designated by
the governing body of the city, all moneys, bonds,
property and records coming into their hands as
such commissioners, and that at the expiration of
their term of office they will surrender and turn
over as aforesaid all funds, bonds properly, papers
and records then in their hands pertaining to their
respective offices Sun upon any such bond may be
brought by any county, city or person injured
\m
10-3-923. City and town justices of the peace Appointment - Vacancies - Disqualification •
Compensation - Payment of fees, fines,
forfeitures or other sums to treasurer.
(1) Each municipality which docs not have a
municipal department of the circuit court may, in
the manner it appoints other oificcrs, appoint a
justice of the peace Justices of (he peace shall be
appointed to terms of four years beginning the first
Monday in February. 1980, provided that justices
now holding office or appointed to fill any vacancy
shall hold office until the succes»or is duly appointed and qualified Municipal justice* of the peace
may be removed from office in the same manner as
county justices.
(2) If a vacancy bhall occur in the office of a
municipal justice, the mayor or town president, by
and with the consent of the governing body, shall
forthwith fill such vacancy by appointment for the
unexpired term The person appointed shall qualify
in the same manner as a municipal justice, and shall
have and exercise all the powers conferred by law
upon such municipal justice In case any municipal
justice shall for any reason be unable or disqualified
to perform the duties o( his office, or shall be
absent, the mayor or town president shall appoint
some other justice of the peace residing within the
county to act as the municipal justice of the peace
pro tempore, and he shall have and discharge the
duties of [sicl such municipal justice might have, but
during the existence of such disability or absence
only
(3) The salary of the municipal justices of the
peace shall be set bv ordinance in the manner prescribed by section 78 5-29
(4) All fees, fines, forfeitures or any other sums
collected by the justice of the peace shall be paid to
the municipal treasurer within seven days of receipt.
(5) Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of a
municipal justice of the peace, the municipality may
contract with the county or another municipality to
share the services of a justice The contract shall be
for the same term as the term of the justice whose
services are sought Municipalities may contract for
the services of a county or municipal justice during
their entire term at any time there is a vacancy in
the office of municipal justice Vacancies may be
created by refusing to reappoint a person to the
office of justice of the peace
im
10-3-924. Appointment of manager.
The governing body of any city or town may by
ordinance establish a manager form of government
and appoint any person to be known as the
manager
irn
10-3-925. Term of office
The manager shall serve at the pleasure of the
governing body except that the governing body may
employ the manager for a term not to exceed three
years The term of employment may be renewed at
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any time Any person serving as manager of a
municipality under this section may be removed with
or without cause by a majority vote o( (he gover
mng body

1977

10-3-926. Duties of the manager
The governing body shall, by ordinance or resol
ution, prescribe the powers, duties and obligations
of ihe manager
if77
10-3-927. Legislative powers and official position
of the mayor not delegated.
The legislative and judicial powers of the mayor,
his position as chairman of the governing body and
any ex officio position the mayor shall hold shall
not be delegated to the manager
im
10-3-923. Attorney.
The city attorney shall have the duty to prosecute
violations of city ordinances and shall have the same
powers in respect to violations of city ordinances as
may be exercised by a county attorney in respect to
violations of state law, including, but not limited to,
granting immunity to witnesses for violations of city
ordinances
\m
Part 10. Civil Service Commission
10-3-1001. Subordinates in police, health, and rire
departments to be appointed from list
10-3-1002. Classified civil service • Employment
constituting.
10-3-1003 Commission • Number, term, vacancies
10*3-1004. Qualifications of commissioners - balarv
Removal
10-3-1005. Organization of commission - Secretary
Offices.
10-3-1006. Rules and regulations - Printing and
distribution.
10-3-1007. Examinations.
10-3-1008 Appointments from civil service list •
Probation period.
10-3-1009. Certification of applicants for position Number • Eligible lists, removal.
10-3-1010. Promotions - Basis • Certification of
applicants.
10-3-1011. Temporary employees.
10-3-1012. Discharge by department head - Appeal to
commission • Hearing and decision
10-3-1013. Annual and special reports by commission

10-3-1001. Subordinates in police, health, and
fire departments to be appointed from list.
The head of each of the police and fire departments of cities of the first and second class and the
health officer in cities of the first class shall, by and
with the advice and consent of the board of city
commissioners, and subject to the rules and regulations of the civil service commission, appoint from
the classified civil service list furnished by the civil
service commission all subordinate officers cmplo
>ees, members or agents in his department, and in
like manner fill all vacancies in the same
im
10-3-1002. Classified civil service - Employment
constituting.
The classified civil service shall consist of alt
places of employment now existing or hereafter
created in or under the police department and the
fire department of each city o f the first and second
class, and the health department in cities of the first
class, except the head of (he departments, deputy
chiefs of the police and fire departments and assistant chiefs of the police department in cities of the
first and second class, and the members of the
board o f health of the departments N o appointm
ems to any of the places of employment constituting
the classified civil service in the departments shall be
^ ode • Co
H

*o u«.h

10-3-1007.

made except according to law and under the rules
and regulations of the civil service commission The
head of each of the departments may, and the
deputy chiefs of the police and fire departments and
assistant chiefs of the police department shall, be
appointed from the classified civil service, and upon
the expiration o f his term or upon the appointment
of a successor shall be returned thereto
1*77
10-3-1003 Commission - Number, term,
vacancies.
In each city of the first and second class there
shall be a civil service commission, consisting of
three members appointed by the board of commissioners Their term of office shall be six years, but
they shall be appointed so that the term of office of
one member shall expire on <he 30th day of June of
each even-numbered year If a vacancy occurs in
the civil service commission, it shall be filled by
appointment by the board of city commissioners for
the unexpired term
\m
10-3-1004. Qualifications of commissioners •
Salary - Removal.
Not more than two members of the civil service
commission shall at any one time be of the same
political party No member of the civil service
commission shall during his tenure of office hold
any other public office, or be a candidate for any
other public office Each member shall receive $25
for each meeting of the commission which he shall
attend, but shall not receive more than SI00 in any
one month In case of misconduct, inability or
willful neglect in the performance of the duties of
the office by any member, the member may be
removed from office by the board of city commissioners by a majority vote of the entire membership,
but the member shall, if he so desires, have the
opportunity to be heard in defense
\rn
10-3-1005. Organization of commission Secretary - Offices.
The civil service commission shall organize by
selecting one of us members chairman, and shall
appoint as secretary one of the available officers or
employees of the city, who shall act and serve
without additional compensation. The secretary shall
keep a record of all meetings of the civil service
commission and of us work and shall perform such
other services as the commission may require, and
shall have the custody of the books and records of
the commission The board of city commissioners
shall provide suitable accomodations and equipment
to enable the civil service commission to attend to
its business
im
10-3-1006. Rules and regulations - Printing and
distribution.
The civil service commission shall make all nece
ssary rules and regulations to carry out the purposes
of this part and for examinations, appointments and
promotions All rules and regulations shall be
printed by the civil service commission for distribution
|?T7
10-3-1007 Examinations,
All applicants for employment in the classified
civil service shall be subject to examination, which
shall be public, competitive and free Examinations
shall be held at such times and places as the civil
service commission shall from time to time determine, and shall be for the purpose of determining
the qualifications of applicants for positions Examinations shall be practical and shall fairly test the
fitness in every respect of the persons examined to
discharge the duties o f the positions to which they
~
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seek t o be appointed, and shall include tests of
physical qualifications and health
1977
10-3-1008. Appointments from civil service list Probation p e n o d .
In all cases the appointing power shall notify the
civil service commission o f each separate position to
be filled, and shall fill such place by the appointment o f o n e o f the persons certified by the commission therefor Such appointment shall be on probation, and of a character and for a period to be
prescribed by the civil service commission
im
10-3-1009. Certification of applicants for position
• Number - Eligible lists, removal.
Whenever a position in the classified civil service
is to be filled, the civil service commission shall as
soon as possible certify to the appointing power the
names of five persons to fill such position from
those persons having the highest standing in the
eligible list but a lesser number may be certified
when there is not the required number on the eligible list. If more than one position is available in the
same department, the civil service commission shall
also certify to the appointing power one additional
name for each additional position to be filled AH
persons not appointed shall be restored to their relative positions on the eligible list All persons who
have been on the eligible list for two years without
appointment shall be removed therefrom and can
only be returned thereto upon regular examination
1983

10-3-1010. P r o m o t i o n s - Basis - Certification
of applicants.
The civil service commission shall provide for
promotion in the classified civil service o n the basis
of ascertained merit, seniority in service and standing obtained by competitive examination, and shall
provide, in ail cases where practicable, that vacancies shall be filled by promotion from the members
o f the next lower rank as submit themselves for the
examination a a d promotion. T h e civil service c o m mission shall certify to the appointing power the
names o f not more than five applicants having the
highest rating for each promotion
I9W
10-3-1011. Temporary employees.
The head o f each department, with the advice and
consent of the board o f city commissioners, may
employ any person for temporary work only,
without making the appointment from the certified
list, but the appointment shall not be longer than
one month in the same calendar year, and under no
circumstances shall the temporary employee be
appointed to a permanent position unless he shall
have been duly certified by the civil service commission as in other cases
1977
10-3-1012. Discharge by department head Appeal to commission - Hearing and decision.
All persons in the classified civil service may be
removed from office or employment by the head o f
the department for misconduct, incompetency or
failure to perform his duties or failure to observe
properly the rules o f the department, but subject to
appeal by the discharged person to the civil service
commission A n y person discharged m a y , within
five days from the issuing by the head o f the department of the order discharging him, appeal there
from to the civil service commission, which shall
fully hear and determine the matter The discharged
person shall be entitled to appear in person and to
have counsel and a public hearing The finding and
decision of the civil service commission upon the
hearing shall be certified to the head of the depart
ment from whose order the appeal is taken, and
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shall be final, and shall forthwith be enforced and
followed by him
1977
10-3-1013. Annual and special reports b>
commission.
The civil service commission shall 11 December of
each year make an annual report to the board of
city commissioners and shall make as many special
reports as the board o f city commissioners shall
request
i»77
Part 11. Personnel Rules and Benefits
10-3-1101 through 10-3.1102 Replied
10-3-1103. Sickness, disability and death benefits
10-3-1104 Library personnel - Monthly wa^e
deductions and matching turns • Time of inclusion.
10-3-1105. Appointive officers and employees
Duration and termination o( term of office
10-3-1106. Discharge or transfer « Appeals - Board •
Procedure.
10-3-1107 Cost of living adjustment • Price index used.

10-3-1101 through 10-3-1102. Repealed.
iw
10-3-1103. Sickness, disability and death benefits.
(1) The governing body o f each municipality may
maintain as to ail elective or appointive
officers and
employees, including heads o f departments, a system
for the payment o f health, dental, hospital, medical,
disability and death benefits to be financed and
administered in a manner and payable upon the
terms and conditions as the governing body o f the
municipality may by ordinance or resolution prescribe
(2) The governing bodies of the municipalities
may create and admimsicr personnel benetit programs separately or jointly with other municipalities
or other political subdivisions of the Stale of Utah
or associations thereof
\m
10-3-1104. Library personnel - Monihlv wage
deductions and matching sums - Time of
inclusion.
(1) The librarians, assistants and employees o f any
public library m a y , at the discretion of the board of
directors of the library, be included within and
participate in the pension, retirement sickness, disability and death benefit svstcm established under
section 10-3-1103
In the event the librarian,
assistants and employees o f the municipality are
included within and participate in the system, there
shall be deducted from the monthly wage or salary
of the librarian, assistants and employees and paid
into the system, a percentage of their wage or salary
equal to the percentage of the monthly wage or
salary o f other employees o f the municipality which
is paid into the system Also there shall be paid
monthly into the system from the funds of the
library a further sum equal to the total amount
deducted monthly from the wage or salary of the
librarian, assistants and employees and paid into the
retirement system
(2) Where the election by the board o f directors
of any library for inclusion of its librarian, assistants and employees within the svstcm ol any municipality is subsequent to the establishment o f the
system, the inclusion mav begin i s of the date of the
establishment of the svstcm or as of the date of the
election as shall be determined b> the board of dir
cctors If inclusion \s as of the date ot the estibhs
hment of the system there shall be paid into the
system in addition to the subsequent monthly wage
deductions and matching sums a sum equal to the
aggregate of monthly pasroil dcduttions and mate
hing sums (hat would have iccrued during the
period beginning with the establishment of the
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<N<;(cm and ending with the election had the librapan, assistants and employees been included within
trn
{he system from its establishment.
lO-J-llOS. Appointive officers and employees Duration and termination of term of office.
All appointive officers and employees of municipalities, other than members of the police departments, fire departments, heads of departments, and
superintendents, shall hold their employment
uiihout limitation of time, being subject to discharge or dismissal only as hereinafter provided.
\m
10-3-1106. Discharge or transfer - Appeals •
Board - Procedure.
(1) No officer or employee covered by section 101-1105 shall be discharged or transferred to a
position with less remuneration because of his politics or religious belief, or incident to, or through
changes, either in the elective officers, governing
bodv. or heads of departments. In all cases where
an\ officer or employee is discharged or transferred
from one position to another for any reason, he
shall have the right to appeal the discharge or transfer to a board to be known as the appeal board
which shall consist of five members, three of whom
shall be chosen by and from the appointive officers
and employees, and two of whom shall be members
of the governing body
(2) The appeal shall be taken by filing written
notice of the appeal with the recorder within ten
dass after the discharge or transfer Upon the filing
of the appeal, the city recorder shall forthwith refer
a copy of the same to the appeal board. Upon
receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder,
the appeal board shall forthwith commence its investigation, take and receive evidence and fully hear
and determine the matter which relates to the cause
for the discharge or transfer
(3) The employee shall be entitled to appear in
person and to be represented by counsel, to have a
public hearing, to confront the witness whose testimony is to be considered, and to examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal board
(4) In the event the appeal board upholds the
discharge or transfer, the officer or employee may
have 14 days thereafter to appeal to the governing
bodv whose decision shall be final. In the event the
appeal board does not uphold the discharge or transfer the case shall be closed and no further proceedings shall be had.
(5) The decision of the appeal board shall be by
secret ballot, and shall be certified to the recorder
*«th 15 days from the date the matter is referred to
»« The board may, in its decision, provide that an
employee shall receive his salary for the period of
time during which he is discharged, or any deficient \ m salary for the period he was transferred to a
Position of less remuneration but not to exceed a 15
da\ period. In no case shall the appointive officer or
employee be discharged or transferred, where an
appeal is taken, except upon a concurrence of at
•east a majority of the membership of the governing
body of the municipality
(M In the event that the appeal board does not
u
PhoId the discharge, or transfer, the recorder shall
ce
nif> the decision to the employee affected, and
a
'<o to the head of the department from whose
0r
der the appeal was taken The employee shall be
Paid his salary, commencing with the next working
da\ following the certification by the recorder of the
appeal board's decision, provided that the empl
0v
ee or officer, concerned reports for his assigned
duties during that next working day
^ • <

o

10-3-1201.

(7) The method and manner of choosing the
members of the appeal board, and the designation
of their terms of office shall be prescribed by the
governing body of each municipality by ordinance,
but the provisions for choosing the three members
from the appointed officers and emplovccs shall in
no way restrict a free selection of members by the
appointive officers and employees of the municipality
\m
10-3-U07. Cost of living adjustment - Price
index used.

(1) The governing body of each municipality may,
in their discretion, adopt a plan to allow any person
who qualifies under this part to receive a cost of
living adjustment m their monthly retirement allowance; but the adjustment allowed shall be a percentage, not to exceed one hundred per cent, of the
sum as would restore the full purchasing power of
each person's original unmodified pension allowance as it was in the calendar year in which the
retirement giving rise to the pension occurred
(2) The amount necessary to restore the full purchasing power of the original unmodified pension
allowance shall be computed from the consumers
price index published by the United States Bureau of
Labor Statistics
(3) Adjustments may be effective as of the date of
this act or at any subsequent date set by the governing body A municipality may choose to pay any
per cent to the maximum amount provided that such
percentage be paid to all qualified persons equally
1177

Part 12. Alternative Forms of Municipal
Government
10-3-1201. Citation of act.
10-3-1202. Legislative finding.
10-3-1203. Election requirements and procedure for
organization under optional form of government.
10-3-1204. Application of act
10-3-1205. Rights, powers, and duties of municipality
operating under optional form.
10-3-1206. Limitation on changing form of government.
10-3-1207. Disapproval o( optional form by voters Limitation on resubmission.
10-3-1209. Election of officers • When new government
operative - Compensation of officials without position
In sew government.
10-3-1209 Council-mayor and council-manager form
defined
10-3-1210 Functions of Ihe council
10-.3-1211. Council members - Qualifications - Term*
o( office.
10-3-1212. Meetings of council - Access to records.
10-3-1213. Chairmen of councils - Power to call
witnesses and administer oath - Quorum - Voting
procedure
10-3-1214. Ordinance adoption under council-mayor
form - Powers of mayor.
10-3-1215 Rules and regulations for government of
council.
10-3-1216. Council members elected from districts •
Boundary • Adjustments.
10-3-1217. Limitations on actions and authority of
council members - Investigatory committees.
10-3-1218. Vacancy in council
10-3-1219. Council-mayor form - Powers and duties
of mayor
10-3-1219 5 Council-mayor form - Ordinance* on
transfer of municipal property and regulation of
subdivisions or annexations
10-3-1220. Council-mayor form - Appointment of
chief administrative officer
10-3-1221 Municipal administrative code In
council-mayor form
10-3-1222. Council-mayor form - \ aeano In office of
mayor.
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52-2-1.

justify when so required or to furnish addition3'
sureties when required, as herein provided, tPc
x
ooat6 OT oWicer cYiargeo. wnYi the duty o\ approving
the bond of such officer shall declare such offi ce
vacant within sixty days after notice personal^
served upon the officer, and at the expiration o(
said sixty-day period such office shall becort1*
vacant unless such sureties justify or addition3*
qualified sureties be furnished within said period

Chapter 2, Failure to Qualify for Office
52-2-1. Time in which to qualify - Failure Office declared vacant.
Whenever any person duly elected or appointed *°
any office of the state or any of its political subo4*'
visions, fails to qualify for such office within su*y
days after the date of beginning of the term o(
office for which he was elected or appointed, su£n
office shall thereupon become vacant and shall t>c
filled as provided by law Whenever the bond of arW
officer of the state or of any of its political subdiv*
isions is canceled, revoked, annulled or otherwise
becomes void or of no effect, without anoth cr
proper bond being given so that continuance 0*
bonded protection is afforded, the office of su£n
officer shall thereupon become vacant and shall P e
official who has failed on the effective date of th ,s
act to qualify for the position to which he w*s
elected or appointed, shall be deemed to corf16
within the provisions of this act, and the office o(
such officer shall become vacant at the end of for*y
davs after the effective date of this act unless leg3*
bond is given before the expiration of such period
and such office shall be filled as provided by law

Chapter 3. Prohibiting Employment of
Relatives

UTAH cooi-

—swg

state of Utah or a political subdivision thereof pr^.
to the time during which said related perso*
assumed sai6 p\ittoc povtoTmifotTem
(b) Where the employee or appointee was appointed or employed subsequent to the time during
which said related person assumed said public pow
ition but prior to the effective date of this act tad
his appointment was not in contravention of the*
provisions of this chapter in effect at the time of
appointment
(c) Where the employee or appointee was or a
eligible or qualified to be employed by a department
or agency of the state of Utah or a political subdi.
vision thereof as the result of his compliance with;
civil service laws or regulations and merit system'
laws or regulations or as the result of a certification/
as to his qualification and fitness by a department*
agency or subdivision of the state authorized so,to
do by law
(d) Where the employee or appointee was or l»
employed by the employing unit because he was or
is the only person available, qualified or eligible for
the position
~\m
52-3-2. Each day of violation a separate offense.
Each day any such person, father, mother,
husband, wife, son, daughter, sister, brother, uncle,
aunt, nephew, niece, first cousins, moth-x-in-law,
father-in-law, brother in-law, sister-in-law,
son in-"iaw or daughter-in-law
is retained in
office by any of said officials >hall be regarded as i
separate offense
lis
52-3-3 Penalty
Any person violating any of the provisions of thu
chapter is guilty of a misdemeanor
i«
52-3-4 Exception in towns.
In towns, this chapter shall not apply to th<
employment of uncles, aunts nephews, nieces ot
cousins
\m

Chapter 4. Open and Public Meetings

52-4-1. Declaration of public policy
52-4-2. Definitions.
52-4*3. Meetings open to the public - Exceptions.
52-4-4. Cosed meeting held upon vote of members •
Business - Reasons for meeting recorded
52-4-5. Purposes of closed meetings - Chance meetings
and social meetings excluded - Disruption of meetings.
52-3-1. Employment of relatives prohibited •
52-4-6. Public notice of meetings.
Exceptions.
52-4-7 Minutes of open meetings • Public records It is unlawful for any person holding any posui0 n
Recording of meetings.
the compensation for which is paid out of pub!'c
52-4-4 Suit to avoid final action - Limitation •
Exceptions.
funds to employ, appoint, or vote for the appoint"
TTieiu-uf: Ins ut tiei fathet r*>t»utfter,'husband, wlfgT '52-4-9. Enforcement or en spier • Suit lo compel
compliance.
son, daughter, sister, brother, uncle, aunt, nephev*.
52-3-1. Employment of relatives prohibited Exceptions.
52-3-2. Each day of violation a separate offense.
52-3-3. Penalty.
52-3-4. Exception in towns.

law, brother-in-law, ststcr-in-law
son inlaw, or daughter-in-law in or to any position 0 r
employment, when the salary, wages, pay or cor*1"
pensation of such appointee is to be paid out of any
public funds. It is unlawful for such appointee l°
accept or to retain such employment when his initial
appointment thereto was made in contravention o(
the foregoing sentence by a person within the
degrees of consanguinity or affinity therein specified
having the direct power o( employment or appointment to such position, or by a board or group of
which such person is a member
The provisions of this section shall not apply
among others to the following employment situ**ions
(a) Where the employee or appointee was appointed or employed by a department or agency o( th c
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52-4-1. Declaration of public policy
In enacting this chapter, the legislature finds and
declares that the state, its agencies and political
subdivisions, exist to aid in the conduct of the
people's business It is the intent of the law that
their actions be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly
trrr
52-4-2. Definitions.
As used in this act
(I) "Meeting" means the convening of a public
body, with a quorum present, whether corporal or
by means of electronic equipment, for the purpose
of discussing or acting upon a matter over which the
public body has jurisdiction or advisory power. This
chapter shall not apply to chance meetings.
"Convening/ as us<d in this subsection, means the
calling of a meeting of a public body by a person or

please co** u » «•» UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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persons authorized to do so for (he express purpose
discussing or acting upon a subject over which
fhai public body has jurisdiction
(2) "Public body" means any administrative,
3dMSory, executive or legislative body of the state or
t> political subdivisions which consists of two or
more persons that expends, disburses or is supported
i, whole or in part by tax revenue and which is
vested with the authority to make decisions regarjing the public's business "Public bod>" docs not
nJude any political party, group or caucus or rules
or sifting committees of the legislature
(*) "Quorum* means a simple majority of the
-Membership of a public body, unless otherwise
jefined by applicable law, but a quorum docs not
mtlude a meeting of two elected officials by themselves when no action, either formal or informal, is
iaken on a subject over which these elected officials
have jurisdiction
mi
52-4-3. Meetings open to the public Exceptions.
Every meeting is open to the public unless closed
pursuant to sections 52-4-4 and 52-4-5
\m
52-4-4 Closed meeting held upon vote of
members • Business - Reasons for meeting
0i

recorded.

A closed meeting may be held upon the affirmauve vote of two-thirds of the members of the
public body present at an open meeting for which
notice is given pursuant to section 52-4-6, provided, a quorum is present No closed meeting is
allowed except as to matters exempted under section
<2 4 5, provided, no ordinance, resolution, rule,
regulation, contract, or appointment shall be appr
o\ed at a closed meeting The reason or reasons for
holding a closed meeting and the vote, either for or
against the proposition to hold such a meeting, cast
b> each member by name shall be entered on the
iiinuies of the meeting.
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to
require any meeting to be closed to the public
im
52-4-5 Purposes of closed meetings - Chinee
meetings and social meetings excluded Disruption of meetings.
(1) A closed meeting may be held pursuant to
action 52-4-4 for any of the following purposes.
(a) Discussion of the character, professional
competence, or physical or mental health of an
ndmduai,
(b) Strategy sessions with respect to collective
bargaining, litigation, or purchase of real property,
(c) Discussion regarding deployment of security
Personnel or devices, and
(d) Investigative proceedings regarding allegations
°f criminal misconduct
(2) This chapter shall not apply to any chance
fneenng or a social meeting No chance meeting or
VOc,
ai meeting shall be used to circumvent this
chapter
(3) This chapter shall not prohibit the removal of
an
Y person who willfully disrupts a meeting to the
fxi
cnt that orderly conduct is seriously comprom
***
5

IfT7

*-4-6 Public notice of meetings.
0) Any public body which holds regular meetings
<nat are scheduled in advance over the course of a
>car shall give public notice at least once each year
of ,l
s annual meeting schedule as provided in this
Action The public notice shall specify the date.
" m e, and place of such meetings
(2) In addition to the notice requirements of
c^^r—
*° L<**

52-4-9.

subsection (1) of this section, each public body shall
give not less than 24 hours' public notice of the
agenda, date, time and place of each of its meetings
(3) Public notice shall be satisfied by
(a) Posting written notice at the principal office
of the public body, or if no such office exists, at the
building where the meeting is to be held and
(b) Providing notice to at least one newspaper
of general circulation within the geographic jurisdiction of the public body, or to a local media corre
spondent
(4) When because of unforeseen circumstances it
is necessary for a public body to hold an emergency
meeting to consider matters of an emergency or
urgent nature, the notice requirements of section 524-6(2) may be disregarded and the best notice
practicable given No such emergency meeting of a
public body shall be held unless an attempt has been
made to notify ail of its members and a majority
votes in the affirmative to hold the meeting.
wi
52-4-7. Minutes of open meetings - Public
records - Recording of meetings.
(1) Written minutes shall be kept of all open
meetings Such minutes shall include
(a) The date, time and place of the meeting,
(b) The names of members present and absent,
(c) The substance of all matters proposed, discussed, or decided, and a record, by individual
member, of votes taken,
(d) The names of ail citizens who appeared and
the substance in brief of their testimony,
(c) Any other information that any member requests be entered in the minutes
(2) Written minutes shall be kept of all closed
meetings Such minutes shall include
(a) The date, time and place of the meeting,
(b) The names of members present and absent,
(c) The names of ail others present except where
such disclosure would infringe on the confidence
necessary to fulfill the original purpose of closing
the meeting.
(3) The minutes are public records and shall be
available within a reasonable time after the meeting
(4) All or any part of an open meeting may be
recorded by any person in attendance, provided, the
recording docs not interfere with the conduct of the
meeting
im
52-4-4. Suit to avoid final action • Limitation
• Exceptions.
Any final action taken in violation of sections 524-3 and 52-4-6 is voidable by a court of comp
ctent jurisdiction Suit to void final action shall be
commenced within 90 days after the action except
that with respect to any final action concerning the
issuance of bonds, notes, or other evidences of
indebtedness suit shall be commenced within 30 days
after the action
\n%
52-4-9. Enforcement of chapter - Suit to compel
compliance.
(1) The attorney general and county attorneys of
the state shall enforce this chapter
(2) A person denied any right under this chapter
may commence sun in a court of competent jurisdiction to compel compliance with or enjoin violat
ions of this chapter or to determine its applicability
to discussions or decisions of a public body The
court may award reasonable attorney fees and court
costs to a successful plaintiff
\m
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(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a)
through (i).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari
for the review of a Court of Appeals abjudication, but
the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified
to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b).

(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its review of
agency adjudicative proceedings.
1968
78-2-3. Repealed.

ises

78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges
pro tempore, and practice of law.
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence for use in the courts of the state
and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The
Legislature may amend the rules of procedure and
evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote
of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the
Legislature.
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Constitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize
retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to
perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall
be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and
admitted to practice law in Utah.
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the
practice of law, including admission to practice law
and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to
the practice of law.
isss
78-2-5.

Repealed.

1968

78-2-6. A p p e l l a t e court administrator.
The appellate court administrator shall appoint
clerks and support staff as necessary for the operation
of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. The
duties of the clerks and support staff shall be established by the appellate court administrator, and
powers established by rule of the Supreme Court.
1966

78-2-7.

Repealed.

1966

78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to court.
The court may at any time require the attendance
and services of any sheriff in the state.
isss
78-2-8 to 78-2-14.

Repealed.

1966,1968

CHAPTER 2a
COURT OF A P P E A L S
Section
78-2a-l.
78-2a-2.
78-2a-3.
78-2a-4.
78-2a-5.

Creation — Seal.
Number of judges — Terms — Functions —
Filing fees.
Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
Review of actions by Supreme Court.
Location of Court of Appeals.

78-2a-l. Creation — Seal.
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals is a court of record and
shall have a seal.
1966
78-2a-2.

Number of j u d g e s — Terms — Func-

tions — Filing fees.
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges.
The term of appointment to office as a judge of the
Court of Appeals is until the first general election
held more than three years after the effective date of

78-2a-3

the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office of a
judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and commences on the first Monday in January, next following the date of election. A judge whose term expires
may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council, until
a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding
judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or.fraction
thereof for the period served.
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in panels of three judges. Assignment to panels
shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a chair for each panel. The
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc.
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a
presiding judge from among the members of the court
by majority vote of all judges. The term of office of the
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is
elected. A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals
may serve in that office no more than two successive
terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or
incapacity of the presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the
office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges
of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of a
judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge
shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of
panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the
Court of Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme
Court and the Judicial Council.
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the
same as for the Supreme Court
1968
78-2a-3. Court of A p p e a l s jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders,
and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies
or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of
adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except
those from the small claims department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of
record in criminal cases, except those involving a
charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(0 appeals from district court in criminal
cases, except those involving a conviction of a
first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs involving a criminal conviction, except those involving a first degree or capital felony;
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(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including but not limited
to divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals
from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals, upon its own motion only
and by the vote of four judges of the court, may certify
to the Supreme Court for original appellate review
and determination any matter over which the Court
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its review of
agency adjudicative proceedings.
1988
78-2a-4. R e v i e w of actions b y Supreme C o u r t
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the
Court of Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.
1906
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in
Salt Lake City. The Court of Appeals may perform
any of its functions in any location within the state.
1966

CHAPTERS
DISTRICT COURTS

Section
78-3-25.
78-3-26.
78-3-27,
78*3-28.
78-3-29.

Assistants for administrator of the
courts — Appointment of trial court
executives.
Courts to provide information and statistical data to administrator of the
courts.
Annual judicial conference.
Repealed.
Presiding judge — Election — Term —
Compensation — Powers — Duties.

78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed.

i$m, i98i, 19S8

78-3-3. Term of judges — Vacancy.
Judges of the district courts shall be appointed initially until the first general election held more than
three years after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office for judges of the
district courts is six years, and commences on the
first Monday in January, next following the date of
election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is
appointed and qualified
1968
78-3-4. Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to circuit court — Appeals.
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all
matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah
Constitution-and ^not prohibited by law.
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary writs and other writs necessary to carry into
effect their orders, judgments, and decrees.
(3) Under the general supervision of the presiding
officer of the Judicial Council and subject to policies
established by the Judicial Council, cases filed in the
district court, which are also within the concurrent
jurisdiction of the circuit court, may be transferred to
the circuit court by the presiding judge of the district
court in multiple judge districts, or the district court
judge in single judge districts. The transfer of these
cases may be made upon the court's own motion or
upon the motion of either party for adjudication.
When an order is made transferring a case, the court
shall transmit the pleadings and papers to the circuit
court to which the case is transferred. The circuit
court has the same jurisdiction as if the case had been
originally commenced in the circuit court and any
appeals from final judgments shall be to the Court of
^Appeals.
(4) Appeals from the final orders, judgments, and
decrees of the district court are under Sections 78-2-2
and 78-2a-3.
(5) The district court has jurisdiction to review
agency adjudicative proceedings as set forth in Chapter 46b, Title 63, and shall comply with the requirements of that chapter, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
1988

Section
78-3-1.
Repealed.
78-3-1.5, 78-3-1.6. Repealed.
78-3-2.
Repealed.
78-3-3.
Term of judges — Vacancy.
78-3-4.
Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to circuit court — Appeals.
78-3-5.
Repealed
78-3-6.
Terms — Minimum of once quarterly.
78-3-7 to 78-3-11. Repealed.
78-3-11.5. State District Court Administrative System — Primary and secondary county
locations.
78-3-12.
Repealed
78-3-12.5. Costs of system.
78-3-13.
Repealed.
78-3-13.4. Counties joining courtjsystem —j^roce^
dure — "Facilities"— Salaries.
78-3-13.5, 78-3-14. Repealed.
78-3-14.5. Allocation of district court fees and
fines.
78-3-15, 78-3-16. Repealed.
78-3-16.5. Fees for filing and other services or actions.
78-3-17.
Repealed.
78-3-17.5. Application of savings accruing to coun78-3-5. Repealed.
tsss
ties.
78-3-18.
Judicial Administration Act — Short ti78-3-6. Terms — Minimum of o n c e quarterly.
tle.
Each district court shall hold court at the county
78-3-19.
Purpose of act.
seat of each county within the district at least once in
78-3-20
Definitions.
i98s
•78-3-2r
Judicial council —-Creation — Members each quarter of the year.
__— Terms and election — Responsibili- rro_o * ^ j f i j l j ^ p n . 1 ^
ties — Reports.
78-3-22.
Presiding officer — Compensation — 78-3-11.5. State District Court Administrative
Duties.
System — Primary and secondary lo78-3-23.
Administrator of the courts — Appointcations.
(U There is established a State District Court AHment — Qualification*! — Salarv.

EXCERPT FROM: RICHFIELD CITY POLICY DEPARTMENT
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL

POLICIES AMD PROCEDURES
Date
Subject
Effective Date

Policy No. 10

January 1 107q
Departmental Discipline
January 1»
l^n

This directive shall supersede all other departmental policies*
dealing with departmental discipline.
Persons Subject to Disciplinary Action
A.

Any officer who violates his trust by committing
any off-ense punishable under the laws, ordinances, or
statutes of the United States, the State of Utah, the City
of Richfield; or who violates any provisions of the Rules
and Regulations of the Richfield City Police Department; or
who disobeys any lawful order; or who is incompetent to
perform his duties; is subject to appropriate disciplinary
action•

B.

The word "discipline11 is a derivative of the latin word
"disciplina", meaninq instruction or education. The
purpose of discipline is to facilitate coordination of
effort. Positive discipline is an inner personal desire to
observe and follow the regulations and procedures of an
organization. Negative discipline is compliance through
fear of punishment or penalty. Tt is the hope that all
officers will exercise positive discipline.

C.

Penalties - Subject to the anproval of the Chief of Police,
the following penalties may be imposed against any
officer or employee of the Department as disciplinary

action:
1)
2)
/

4)

5)

V e r b a l reo*-u* .tond.
. . - on ror?r*iTTTdnd #
Ylr4

Suspension.
Demotion.
Dismissal.

Departmental Authority to Discipline
D.

Final departmental disciplinary authority and responsibility
rests with the Chief of Police.

Except for verbal

reprimands and emergency suspensions, all departmental
discipline must be taken or approved by the Chief of
Police.
E.

Other supervisory personnel may take the following
disciplinary measures:

F.

1)

Verbal reprimand.

2)

Written reprimand

3)

officer).
Emergency suspensions.

4)

VJritten recommendations for other penalties.

(subject to approval by the commanding

Emergency Suspension - Any command or supervisory officer
has the authority to impose emergency suspension until the
next business day against an officer or employee v/hen Lt is
apparant that such action is in the best interest of the
Department.

G.

Follow-Up Action on Emergency Suspension - An officer or
employee receiving an emergency suspension shall be
required to report to the Chief of Police on the next business
day at 1000 hours (10:00 a.m.) unless otherwise directed
by competent authority.

The command or supervisory officer

imposing or recommending the suspension shall also report
to the Chief of Police a t the same time.
Comp 1 a i n t s Aga I n s t 1 >o .1 1 c e P er so nne 1
H.

All complaints arising externally (from ~utside the Police
Department) shall be brought to the attention of f b e Chief
immediately.
Internal complaints shall be' brought to the attention of
the Chief or other supervisory officer. •

J.

All complaints against Police Personnel shall be reduced
to written form.

K.

A supervisory officer receiving an internal complaint shall
conduct an immediate investigation into the allegation. If
the allegation is substantiated he shall then take action to
correct the infraction immediately.

Reports of Disciplinary Action Taken or Recommended
L.

Whenever disciplinary action is taken or recommended,
(except for oral reprimand) a written report must be
submitted immediately containing the following information:
1)

The name, rank, and present assignment cf the person
being disciplined.

2)

The date(s) and time(s) of the misconduct and the
location(s)•

3)

The section number (s) of this manual violated and/ ,>r
the common name for the infraction.

4)

A complete statement of the facts of the misconduct,

5)

The punishment imposed or recommended.

6)

The written signature and rank of the preparing
officer and his position in relation to the
member being disciplined.

Distribution of Reports of Disciplinary Action The report shall be distributed as follows by the
officer imposing or recommending disciplinary action:
1)

Original and copy to the Chief via the complete
chain of cor-nand.

2)

Copy to the person being charged.

3)

COPV

4)

Copy retained by officer imposing or recommending

to the City Manaaer.

the action.
Endorsement and Forwarding of Disciplinary Reports Each level in the chain of command must endorse and
forv:ard reports bearing on disciplinary matters
received.

Sue*

M^lorsements may be one of approval,

disapproval or modification.

No r.'fiiber or employee

shall alter or uc.i se to be altered or withdraw any
disciplinary reoort.

Disciplinary reports in transit

through the chain of command shall not be delayed,
but must be reviewed, endorsed, and forwarded as soon
as possible.

Disciplinary reports shall be filed in

accordance with current departmental directives.
Informing the Person Being Disciplined - The member
or employee being disciplined shall be informed of the
charges and penalties at the time such action is taken.
Citizen Complaints Against Police Personnel Complaints by citizens against members or employees

of this Department

>ha 1 1 he i i oeessed in 1 he following

manner:
1)

During Normal Business Hours - Such complaints
will be referred to the Chief unless it is of
such minor or invalid nature that the officer
first contacted can dispose of the incident
satisfactorily*

2)

Other Times - Outside normal business hours, the
officer receiving the complaint shall notify the
senior officer on duty who will take one of the
following actions:
a)

Instruct the receivinc officer to investigate
the complaint.

b)

Receive and investigate the complaint himself.

c)

Notify the Chiet or commanding officer when he
feels such action is necessary.

Investigation.of Mlegec Misconduct Reportu Against
Officers Any officer assianed the investigation of an alleged
act of misconduct on the part of a member or employee
of this Department shall conduct a thorough and accurate
investigation.
Such investigation shall include formal statements from
all parties concerned, when necessary and pertinent,
the gathering and preservation of any physical evidence
pertaining to the case, and all other information
bearing on the matter.
Investigation Reports - The investigation of alleged
acts of misconduct must be reduced to writing and

include the following:
1)

A summary of the complaint or alleged act of
misconduct.

2)

Pertinent portions of the statements of all
parties to the incident.

3)

A description of the incident, physical evidence,
and other evidence important to the case.

4)

The observation and conclusions of the investigating
officer.

Distribution of Investigative Reports The report shall be distributed as follows by the
officer conductinq the investigation:
1)

Original to the Chief.

2)

Cony to the City Manager.

Actions That Can Result in Disciplinary Action If an investigation determines that an officer or
employee is guilty of any of the following offenses,
he shall be either reprimanded, suspended, or dismissed;
according to the nature and seriousness of the offense:
1)

Hillful violation of the rules, regulations, and
policies of the Department.

2)

Shielding the actions or abetting a fellow officer
in the violation of any law or departmental
regulation or policy.

3)

Insubordination, and/or the disrespect to a
superior officer.

4)

Failure to comply with the valid verbal orders of -a
superior officer.

5)

Failing to assist a fellow officer when requested,
in accomplishing an arrest or in serving a legal
process.

6)

Conduct subversive to the aood order and discipline
wit hin—t he—Depa r t me n t-.

7)

The use of disrespectful language toward or
concerning any fellow officer or an employee*

S)

Making derogatory remarks about other officers or
employees either to members of the Department or
to any person outside the Department unless it is
done as a formal statement to a superior officer or
an official investigative board,

9)

The iibe ci unnecessary violence or discourtesy
against a prisoner.

10)

Discourtesy toward any citizen.

11)

Incompetence or unwillingness to render satisfactory
service, as shown by performance evaluations below
satisfactory standards or as otherwise determined by
supervisory officers.

12)

Absence without leave or failure to notify the
proper authority concerning an absence.

13)

Falsely reporting reason for absence as being sick.

14)

Sleeping while on duty.

15)

Acts involving moral turpitude including immorality,
indecency, lewdness, or dishonesty.

16)

Intoxication and/or the use of intoxicating drugs
or beverages while on duty or at any time while
in uniform. No officer or employee shall appear on
duty in an unfit condition due to the consumption of

alcohol! "Unfit condition" shall mean having
any measurable amount of alcohol in the blood.
17)

Undue familiarity with persons of bad repute.

18)

Failure to pay just debts.

19)

Knowingly allowing another person to use an
officer's badge and/or identification card.

(fo) Disclosure of confidential information to unauthorized persons.

T.

21)

Continued or gross neglect; of personal appearance,
of duty, or in the use of departmental materials
and equipment.

22)

Negligent or willful damage to City property.

23)

Failure to respond to proper assignments.

24)

Failure to submit proper reports.

25)

Failure to appear in Court at the proper time and
place after receiving notification of trial or
hearing.

26)

Failure to maintain a clean an^ functioning firearm.
This shall apply whether the weapon is personally
owned or issued by the Department.

27)

The acceptance of any gratuity.

23)

Conduct unbecoming a professional police officer
such as to bring one's self, the City, or the
Department into disrepute.

29)

Other forms of misconduct as determined by the
administrative officials of the Deportment and
the City.

Actions That Shall Result in Direct Dismissal If an investigation determines that an officer or

is guilty of any of the following offenses, he shall
he dismissed from the Department:

U.

1)

Conviction of the violation of any ordinance,
statute, or law, the violation of which is considered to be a serious offense.

2)

The acceptance of mon^y or anything of value,
in consideration for refraining from taking proper
legal action aqainst any person suspected of the
commission of a crime.

3)

The material falsification of an application for
employment.

4)

The use of bribery or political influence to secure
employment in the Department or advantages while
so employed.

Rehabilitation Whenever possible, personnel will be warned and
given an opportunity to innrove before dismissal is
made.
A member or officer may be claced on probation for a
specified neriorl cf time if circumstances warrant it.
During this time, ^e wi] 1 be closely supervised and
evaluated with the hope of salvaqinq such individual.

V.

Exit Interviews ^**xirtr interviews nay be held with -the Chief of Police
if desired by the dismissed person.

W.

Appeals A member of the Department may request a review of
disciplinary action by submitting a written request

to the Chief of Police. Additional appeal procedures
may be followed as outlined in the Richfield City
Personnel Policies and Procedures manual.
Dismissals are subject to appeal to the Richfield City
Appeals Board. Procedures for such appeals are outlined
in the Richfield City Personnel Folicies and Procedures
manual.

